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It’s not just the thought that counts: An experimental study on the hidden cost of giving 
 
Xiaofei Pan and Erte Xiao1 
 
Abstract   
Receiving a gift can create an impulse to reciprocate, even when doing so may be inefficient and 
potentially harmful to a third party. This paper provides a theoretical framework for a pure gift 
effect on reciprocity impulses and experimental evidence that such an effect exists: that is, a gift 
receiver will favor an actual gift giver over an intended gift giver, even if the intended gift giver 
incurred the same costs and signaled the same intention to give. This result contrasts with the 
predictions of existing theories on social preferences. We also show that the pure gift effect is 
present even when it leads to a less efficient outcome, or when the gift is given without the 
expectation of future returns. Our findings suggest that when reciprocating a gift becomes socially 
inefficient, it may be more advantageous to guard against gift receiving or to keep donations 
“secret” than to try to control the intent to give.   
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1. Introduction 
Gift giving is an important social phenomenon and is ubiquitous in human society. The act of 
giving triggers a receiver’s obligation to reciprocate (Mauss, 1954, Cialdini 2001). The receiver 
often feels compelled to return the favor, even when there is no monetary benefit to doing so. 
Thus, gift giving can be socially optimal, as it initiates social ties and facilitates cooperative 
relationships (Akerlof, 1982; Carmichael and Macleod, 1997; Falk, 2007). Nonetheless, there is 
also a dark side to gift giving: a receiver’s reciprocal behavior may harm a third party’s interest 
and even lead to inefficient social outcomes (Cialdini, 2001). For example, gift giving and 
reciprocity have been identified as playing an important role in sustaining vote buying and vote 
selling that could potentially undermine the desired effects of the democratic electoral process 
(Finan and Schechter, 2012). In this paper, we investigate the underlying mechanism responsible 
for a receiver’s reciprocal behavior when there is negative externality. 
 Previous studies of two-person exchange environments absent externalities have identified 
intentions as one key to understanding reciprocal behavior (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Al-Ubaydli and Lee 2009). This literature argues that people are strongly 
disposed to infer the intentions behind others’ actions, and to respond favorably to kindness and 
negatively to unkindness. People react to the same outcome differently if they infer different 
intentions motivating others’ actions. The importance of intentions in two-person reciprocal 
relationships raises the question of to what extent the intention behind the gift predicts the 
receiver’s reciprocal behavior towards the giver, even though such reciprocity harms a third party 
and reduces social welfare. Does the receiver favor the gift giver at the cost of third parties only 
because the gift giver has signaled a good intention, while other third parties have not?  If a 
receiver demonstrates favoritism only because she2 wants to reciprocate the gift giver’s good 
intention, then a policy that forbids the recipient from receiving the gift will not help to mitigate 
favoritism. The reason is that the gift giver has already signaled good intentions by attempting to 
give. Our study aims at understanding the role of intentions in a gift exchange relationship with 
externalities.  
We draw attention to the difference between receiving gifts and receiving intentions. The 
literature in philosophy on moral luck has noted a difference between a person who “tried hard to 
                                                          
2
For simplicity, we use “she” to refer to the receiver and “he” to refer to the gift giver and the third party, rather than 
using he/she. 
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help but failed” and one who actually succeeded in helping, even if her success was the result of 
random luck (Nagel, 1979; Williams, 1981; Scanlon, 2008; Nelkin, 2013). This situation is 
directly relevant to controlling reciprocal behavior with negative externalities.  For instance, in the 
case of vote-buying, electoral candidates offer cash or goods in exchange for the vote. The theory 
of moral luck suggests we will observe less vote-selling if voters are required to abstain from 
receiving gifts. However, the theory of intention may predict no change as long as a candidate has 
already conveyed the intention of giving. For instance, when multiple candidates compete for the 
vote from the same group of citizens (primarily those who have no particular affiliations with any 
candidate), moral luck theory predicts that voters would favor the candidate from whom they 
actually received the gift. And this is true even when voters know that other candidates would also 
be just as willing to offer the same (but not-received) bribe3. In naturally occurring environments, 
it is of course difficult to know the difference between receiving gifts and receiving intentions. 
The reason is that it is nearly impossible to know precisely what voters know about the intentions 
of all the candidates when examining their reciprocal behavior and to identify the underlying 
mechanism for such reciprocity. Laboratory experiments can control this information and help us 
better understand the mechanisms underlying an individual’s reciprocal behavior. They can also 
provide a theoretical foundation for designing policies to curb socially undesirable reciprocal 
behavior.  
We develop and test the hypothesis that a receiver will favor the gift giver from whom she 
receives a gift over a third party who paid the identical cost to signal the intention of giving. In 
other words, we hypothesize that people feel in debt to the gift they receive. We call this a pure 
gift effect. To test this hypothesis, we design an experiment based on previous experiments used to 
study bribery and corruption4. In these experiments, a bribery relationship between the briber and 
the bribee is modeled using a gift exchange game with negative externality. The bribee’s 
reciprocal behavior is socially undesirable because it harms third parties (Abbink et al.,2002; 
                                                          
3
We can think of bribery in this case as a competitive market where candidates compete to successfully bribe a voter. 
Candidates are willing to pay a voter an amount up to the value of the return to the bribe. Like any market, the success 
of winning a voter’s vote is often determined not only by the candidate’s own intentions but also by factors outside of 
his/her control. For example, a candidate may have a limited budget such that she is able to bribe only a proportion of 
voters.  
4 One may question to what extent the behavior observed in such experiments extends to the bribery and corruption in 
the naturally occurring environment. This is a common concern related to the external validity of laboratory 
experiment research. Several recent papers have provided evidences supporting the external validity of the findings 
from lab experiments (Dai, Galeotti and Villeval 2016; Herbst and Mas 2015; Kroll and Rustagi 2016).   
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Malmendier and Schmidt, 2012). However, in these experiments, the third party often cannot send 
any signal to the gift recipient. Thus, it is unclear whether the “corrupt” behavior observed in the 
experiment is due to the intention difference between the third party and the gift giver. A key 
feature of our experiment is that it minimizes the possibility that people will be treated differently 
by the gift receiver due to differences in their intentions to give (or to bribe). One goal of our 
study is to shed light on the role of intention in the “corrupt behavior” observed in the previous 
experiments.  
In our experiment, participants play the role of either a Divider or a Receiver. The 
experiment consists of two stages. In the first stage, Dividers can decide whether to divide a fixed 
small amount of money with a Receiver equally or keep all the money and leave nothing to the 
Receiver. Dividers make this decision prior to being matched with a particular Receiver. After all 
Dividers make their decisions, their decision is randomly assigned to a Receiver and each 
Receiver receives the amount given by the randomly assigned Divider. In the second stage, each 
Receiver must decide how to allocate resources between two Dividers: the one whose decision 
affects her payoff in the first stage and the other whose decision does not affect her payoff in the 
first stage. The Receiver earns an extra fixed amount of money for completing the allocation 
decisions in the second stage. Using a strategy method, we focus on the Receiver’s allocation 
decisions when her randomly assigned (paired) Divider and the other Divider have indicated the 
same generosity towards her (in the experiment we call the former Divider P and the latter Divider 
N). Our design ensures that, in this case, the two Dividers have signaled the same intentions and 
have the same amount of earnings before the Receiver’s allocation decisions.  
Our main research question is whether a Receiver, in the second stage, will show 
favoritism towards her Divider P (i.e., the actual gift giver) at the cost of Divider N (i.e., the third 
party) who would be just as generous. In addition, we design various conditions to address the 
following two questions. First, does such favoritism, if any, vary with the cost of social efficiency? 
To address this question, a Receiver is asked to make allocation decisions under several 
conditions where every dollar allocated to the gift giver costs the third party different amounts.  
Second, does the favoritism towards the gift giver vary depending on whether the Receiver 
believes a gift giver expects a future return when he decides to give? Answering this question 
sheds light on whether the favoritism towards gift givers would occur even in altruistic gift giving 
situations, such as donation, where gifts are given without any intention to “bribe.” To address 
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this question, we compare two treatments: the Expected reciprocity opportunity treatment 
(henceforth, Expected) and the Unexpected reciprocity opportunity treatment (henceforth, 
Unexpected). The Expected treatment differs from the Unexpected treatment in that participants in 
the latter are not told about the details of the second stage when participating in the first stage 
(although they do know that the experiment consists of two stages). 
 We find strong evidence of the pure gift effect. When a Receiver receives a gift from a 
divider, she allocates more to this divider than to the third party who would have been just as 
generous to her but did not have the opportunity. Such favoritism towards the gift giver persists in 
both treatments, even when it is less legitimate because it entails efficiency costs, i.e., the gain to 
the gift giver is less than the cost to the third party.   
Our study provides important behavioral insights on previous experimental studies on 
corruption. Our results suggest that intention alone cannot explain the “corrupt” behavior 
observed in the previous experiments. Moreover, favoritism occurs even when the gift giver does 
not expect any future return (i.e. no intention to bribe). In practice, intentions are often viewed as 
an important determinant of socially harmful behavior, such as corruption. 5  However, our 
findings suggest that intent to bribe may not be required to trigger “corrupt behavior” that leads to 
the less socially efficient outcome. Given the difficulty in confirming the intent behind giving, the 
pure gift effect provides behavioral evidence for the rationale of controlling gifts per se when 
designing institutions to curb corruption6. Moreover, our results suggest that the ideal of a “secret 
donation” or a “secret ballot” (Ayres and Bulow, 1998) 7 should be applied not only to those who 
give or vote with the expectation of special access and influence, but also to those who do not 
have such expectations.  
                                                          
5 For example, several pharmaceutical companies, such as GSK and Novartis, define bribery and corruption as 
“giving, offering or receiving an undue reward with the intention of influencing the behavior of someone in 
government or business to obtain a commercial advantage.”(see 
http://www.gsk.com/content/dam/gsk/globals/documents/pdf/AntiCorruption-Booklet.pdf). The US legal system also 
requires proof of intent as a necessary element of the crime of bribery to determine the discharge of official duties 
regardless of whether the official has accepted the bribe (http://bribery.uslegal.com/elements-of-offense/intent/) 
6 Indeed, the UK bribery Act differs from US FCPA (Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) in that the Bribery Act makes no 
requirement for a “corrupt” or “improper” intent in relation to the bribery of a foreign public official, although the 
requirement remains for the general bribery offence 
(http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/52195/differences-between-the-uk-bribery-act-and-the-
us-foreign-corrupt-practices-act). 
7 Also see (http://www.law.yale.edu/news/2021.htm) for an interesting article by Ackerman and Ayres. They argue 
that it will be more difficult for parties to sell access or influence if we keep political donations secret, because in that 
case politicians are not able to determine who has given how much. 
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Our findings provide theoretical insights on modeling reciprocity when multiple parties are 
involved. Previous theoretical and empirical studies on two-person gift exchanges cannot inform 
whether the gift receiver’s reciprocal behavior is influenced by the gift giver’s intention or by the 
gift she receives. The reason is that reciprocating intentions are always perfectly correlated with 
reciprocating the gift in two person interactions (Strassmair, 2009; Stanca, 2010). We show that 
the Receiver’s behavior observed in our experiment is inconsistent with the most prominent social 
preference theories, such as intention-based and outcome-based theories. Differentiating receiving 
a gift from receiving the intention of giving is important in predicting behavior when more than 
one party intends to give. Our data suggest that a Receiver distinguishes between the one that 
benefited her and the one who intended to benefit her but, by chance, was not able to do so.  
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses recent research related to 
the negative externality of gift giving. Section 3 describes the experiment design. Section 4 
presents a revised intention-based model incorporating moral luck. Section 5 presents our main 
experimental results. Section 6 discusses the findings and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature on Negative Externality of Gift Giving 
Previous experiments on gift exchange with externality are mainly motivated by the topics on 
corruption. Abbink et al. (2002) first designed the bribery game, which shows that a receiver 
reciprocates toward a briber at the cost of third parties. Abbink (2004) further studied how staff 
rotation influences corruption. Barr and Serra (2010) investigated the connection between culture 
and corruption. Van Veldhuizen (2012) examined whether higher wages contribute to reducing 
corruption. Currie et al. (2013) conducted a field experiment and found that gift giving creates 
positive (negative) externalities for third parties (not) associated with the gift giver. A common 
feature of these studies is that the third party is always in a passive role, and thus cannot signal 
any intentions to the receiver. Recent field studies on vote buying do not allow us to know how 
voters perceive the intentions of the third parties (Hicken et al 2014; Vincente 2014).  As a result, 
we cannot learn from these studies whether the “harmful” reciprocal behavior is simply due to the 
intention difference between the gift giver and the third party.  
Several recent studies have added treatments in which third parties can signal their 
intentions. Malmendier and Schmidt (2012) conducted an Incentive treatment in which a recipient 
could receive gifts from both parties. Compared to a treatment in which only the assigned 
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potential gift giver is allowed to give a gift, the favoritism towards the gift giver is reduced when 
the third party can also give a gift to the recipient. Gneezy et al. (2013) also found that subjects 
are less likely to favor one party over another if they take gifts from both. Nonetheless, these 
studies are unable to separate the intention effect from the pure gift effect due to the fact that the 
intent to give always results in actual gifts to the recipient. By contrast, our study separates these 
two effects: both the gift giver and the third party may signal their intention to give, but the 
recipient only receives a gift from the gift giver. 
Studies on conflict of interest also suggest the potential negative externality of gift giving. 
Previous literature has studied two major types of conflicts of interest. The first type involves 
conflicts between the professional’s personal (usually financial) interests and the interests of 
another party (Loewenstein et al. 2011; Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 2011). Another type of conflict 
involves competing loyalties. This latter type of conflict may be between one party (client or 
patient) and another party to whom the professional owes contractual duties. This could include, 
for example, sponsors of research, insurance companies or employers (Moore et al. 2006). In all 
these cases, conflict of interest is often defined as “[t]he situation in which a public official or 
fiduciary who, contrary to the obligation and absolute duty act for the benefit of the public or a 
designated individual, exploits the relationship for personal benefit, typically pecuniary.”8 For 
instance, accounting firms that provide both auditing and consulting services to the same client 
may be biased in their auditing services due to the fact that an unfavorable auditing report of the 
client will risk their future earnings on consultant services for the same client (Moore et al. 2006). 
In contrast, the gift receiver in our study does not gain any tangible benefit by favoring one 
party at the cost of another. Thus, strictly speaking, there is no “conflict of interest” in the 
receiver’s decision problem. Nevertheless, our study suggests that a profitable relationship that 
occurred in the past can still lead an agent to favor her previous benefactor at the cost of others, 
even when there is no monetary benefit to doing so. The benefactor’s intention is not the only 
cause for such favoritism.  
 
3. Experiment Design 
Our experiment is built on previous experimental research on corruption and bribery when the gift 
exchange relationship harms third parties (see Abbink et al., 2002; Malmendier and Schmidt, 
                                                          
8http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/conflict+of+interest 
 
   8 
 
2012)9. Figure 1 outlines the structure of the experimental paradigm. The key feature of our 
design is minimizing the difference between the gift giver and the third party. In particular, both 
the gift giver and the third party can signal generosity to the gift receiver. For the receiver, the 
only difference between the gift giver and the third party is that the gift she receives comes from 
the gift giver.  
The experimental paradigm consists of two stages, with one decision task in each stage. In 
Stage I (see Figure 1a), Dividers are given $4 and Receivers are given $0. Prior to being matched 
with a particular Receiver, each Divider decides how to divide $4 between himself and a Receiver. 
A Divider can either give $2 to a Receiver and keep $2 for himself or keep all $4 to himself.  
After all Dividers have made their decisions, the computer randomly assigned each Divider’s 
decision to a different Receiver. Next, the computer randomly assigns four participants into a 
group. Each group has two Dividers and the corresponding two Receivers whose Stage I payoffs 
are affected by the decision of each of the two Dividers in Stage II (Figure 1b).  
Our design of Stage I ensures that within a group, both Dividers can signal intentions 
(generous or selfish) to each of the two Receivers. For example, if both Dividers choose to split 
the $4 equally between them and a Receiver, the Receiver should view the two Dividers as 
equally kind. In addition, there is no wealth difference between the two Dividers when they make 
the same division decisions. For example, if both Dividers choose to give $2 to a Receiver, both 
will earn $2 in the first stage (although the $2 given by the Dividers went to different Receivers). 
To minimize the perceived difference between the two Dividers, we also use neutral terms to 
name the two Dividers. In the experiment, for each Receiver, the Divider whose decision is 
assigned to the Receiver is named as “Divider P” and the other Divider is named as “Divider N.” 
Likewise, for each Divider, the Receiver who was assigned his decision is named as “Receiver P” 
and the Receiver who was assigned the other Divider’s decision is named as “Receiver N”. As we 
explain more in the next paragraph, the grouping mechanism also ensures that from each 
Receiver’s perspective, either Divider P or Divider N is in the identical position in that each 
                                                          
9 To provide clean evidence for the role of intention in reciprocity with negative externality, we describe the 
experiment to the subjects in context-free neutral language. In particular, we do not use words such as “bribe,” 
“corrupt,” “harm,” or “inefficient”. Abbink and Henning-Schmidt (2006) conducted an experiment to compare the 
results where a corruption game using context-free wording (similar to our experiment) and another where the context 
is heavily loaded with negative ethical preconceptions. They did not find significant differences between the two 
games and conjecture that “the experimental design transmits the essential features of a bribery situation already with 
neutral framing”. 
 
   9 
 
divider’s payoffs in Stage II are determined by his Receiver P and Receiver N with an equal 
chance. Thus, for a particular Receiver, the only difference between the two Dividers is that only 
one of them is responsible for her earnings in Stage I as a result of random matching. 
 
Figure 1.  Experiment Paradigm 






b. Matching procedure. Each Divider’s decision is randomly assigned to a Receiver. Two 
Dividers and two Receivers randomly form a group. 






c. Stage II. In each group, each Receiver simultaneously and independently decides how to 
allocate the five points between Divider P and Divider N.  The decision of one of the Receivers 








Divider   
  
        
Receiver 
… …   
… …   
         
         Randomly assigns one Divider’s 
decision to one Receiver  
                   
          Randomly group two Dividers 
and two Receivers 
P: Points allocated to Divider P 
 
N: Points allocated to Divider N 
… …   
P      N=5-P N=5-P        P 
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 In Stage II, a Receiver receives 5 points. The Receiver is required to allocate all the points 
between Divider P and Divider N (Figure 1c). A Receiver’s allocation decisions do not affect her 
payoffs in Stage II. In particular, a Receiver earns a fixed $11 in Stage II. We use strategy 
methods to elicit a Receiver’s allocation decisions in all four possible Stage I scenarios (listed in 
Table 1) 10. Scenarios a and c were the symmetric outcome scenarios, where both Dividers had 
signaled identical intentions to the Receiver. We were particularly interested in Receivers’ 
decisions in scenario a, where both Dividers had signaled generosity to the Receiver. Therefore, in 
the strategy method we always presented scenario a first and randomized the order of scenarios b, 
c and d.  
 
 Table 1:  Decision Scenarios for Receivers 
 Four possible outcomes in Stage I 
a. Your Divider P chooses Option A ($2, $2); Your Divider N chooses Option A ($2, $2). 
b. Your Divider P chooses Option A ($2, $2); Your Divider N chooses Option B ($4, $0). 
c. Your Divider P chooses Option B ($4, $0); Your Divider N chooses Option B ($4, $0) 
d. Your Divider P chooses Option B ($4, $0); Your Divider N chooses Option A ($2, $2). 
 
 Three Valuation Rules 
 
Valuation rules Divider P Divider N 
Rule 1  1 point worth $1 1 point worth $1 
Rule 2 1 point worth $1 1 point worth $2 
Rule 3 1 point worth $2 1 point worth $1 
 
 In addition, for each scenario, there were three possible valuation rules and each rule 
specified the dollar value of the point (either $1 or $2) to Divider P and Divider N (see Table 1). 
Participants were told that at the end of the experiment, the decision of one of the two Receivers 
                                                          
10 Strategy method allows us to collect more data and conduct within subject comparison. The main disadvantage of 
the strategy method is that it may diminish the effect of emotions. However, if we assume that the positive emotion 
towards the actual gift giver is greater than the emotion towards the intended one, the strategy method would work 
against our hypothesis.   
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under one of the three valuation rules would be randomly selected. The selected Receiver’s 
decision for the selected valuation rule and for the actual Stage I outcome would determine the 
two Dividers’ payoffs in Stage II (see Appendix E for instructions and screenshots). Note that as 
only one (of the two) Receiver’s decision will be applied to determine the two Dividers’ earnings, 
this design minimizes the possibility that a Receiver’s allocation decision may be affected by her 
beliefs regarding the other Receiver’s allocation decision11.  
As shown in Table 1, under Rule 1, each point is worth the same amount to the two 
Dividers. Thus, Rule 1 is efficiency neutral. We use Rule 1 to identify whether a Receiver favors 
one Divider at the cost of the other when there was no efficiency loss. The degree of favoritism 
can be measured by  ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙= ($𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑃 − $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑁 ) where $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑃  is the earnings a Receiver assigned 
to Divider P and $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑁  is the earnings a Receiver assigned to Divider N under Rule 1.  
Under Rule 2, one point to Divider P is worth less than one point to Divider N. The 
opposite is true for Rule 3. That is, it is either inefficient to assign points to Divider P under Rule 
2, or to assign points to Divider N under rule 3. Thus, by comparing the amount of earnings 
allocated to Divider P ($𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 2
𝑃 ) under Rule 2 and to Divider N under Rule 3 ( $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒3
𝑁 ), we are able 
to measure the degree of favoritism when favoritism not only harms the other party but also leads 
to efficiency loss: ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦= ($𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒2
𝑃 − $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒3
𝑁 ). Assuming the less efficient the favoritism is, the 
less legitimate the favoritism is. The three valuation rules allow us to learn whether a Receiver 
showed favoritism toward Divider P at the cost of Divider N, and, if so, whether the favoritism 
persisted even when it was less legitimate in that it led to efficiency loss.  
 
Treatments 
We conducted two treatments: Expected treatment and Unexpected treatment. The only difference 
between the two treatments was that in the Expected treatment, participants were given all the 
detailed information about the two stages at the beginning. By contrast, in the Unexpected 
                                                          
11 One may argue that this design may still lead receivers to consider what the other receiver would do and thereby 
affect their behavior. First, without further assumptions, a receiver can form any type of beliefs regarding what the 
other receiver would do and there could be multiple equilibria. Our hypothesis of “pure gift effect” predicts a certain 
type of belief (a receiver should/would give more to her Divider P than Divider N) and thus selects certain 
equilibrium over others.  Therefore, to argue that there might be a belief of favoring the actual gift giver is consistent 
with our hypothesis of “pure gift effect”. Second, we asked receivers in a survey after the experiment whether they 
thought about what the other receiver might do when they were making the decisions.  More than 70% receivers 
answered “No”. Among those who answered “Yes”, only 2 wrote that such a consideration affected their decisions.    
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treatment, participants were told that the session consisted of two experiments, but did not know 
what the second experiment was about until they had made their decisions in the first experiment. 
Note that we described the two parts as “Stage I” and “Stage II” in the Expected treatment, but use 
“Experiment I” and “Experiment II” to refer to these two parts in the Unexpected treatment. This 
is to better separate the two parts of the Unexpected treatment and minimize the possibility that 
Dividers may act strategically in the first part. When participating in Experiment I, all they knew 
was that their earnings in Experiment I would not be affected by Experiment II. This was common 
knowledge. We informed the subjects of the existence (although not the details) of the second 
stage to avoid concerns about deception, as Dividers’ decisions in the first stage could affect their 
earnings in the second one. Thus, Unexpected, like Expected, controls for intention differences 
between the gift giver and the third party, but further minimizes the intention of “bribery” of both 
the gift giver and the third party.  
 
Survey 
After players finished making their decisions, and before seeing the outcome, they were also 
incentivized to predict how many points a Receiver would give to her Divider P and Divider N in 
each scenario under each valuation rule. Participants were paid $1 for completing the survey. 
They were also told two questions would be randomly selected at the end of the experiment, and 
they would receive $1 for each correct answer.  
At the end of the experiment, we also asked Receivers why they thought Dividers might 
give $2 to a Receiver and why they thought Dividers might keep all of the $4. The answer to these 
questions allowed us to determine whether Receivers indeed perceived Dividers’ intentions 
differently between the Unexpected and Expected treatments.   
 
Experiment Procedure 
We conducted the experiment at Pittsburgh Experimental Economics Lab using z-tree 
(Fischbacher 2007). 124 subjects participated in our experiment, with 45% (56 subjects) men and 
54% (68 subjects) women. The majority of the participants were Caucasian (74%), and the second 
and third largest groups were Asian (15%) and Black or African American (9%), respectively. 
Upon arriving, subjects were seated in a booth separated from each other so that they could not 
communicate or see other subjects during their decision making process. Before making decisions, 
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subjects were randomly assigned an ID number, which determined their roles. All decisions were 
made privately and anonymously through the computer interface z-tree. Each Receiver was asked 
to make multiple decisions in each of the four scenarios. To ensure receivers paid attention to each 
scenario, we always first presented the specifics of a scenario on the screen for 20 seconds and 
subjects could not skip the screen until the time was up. Then receivers made the allocation 
decisions under each of the three valuation rules with the outcome scenario remaining on top of 
the decision screen. After finishing all the decisions, receivers saw the calculated dollar value of 
their allocation decisions and were asked to confirm the decisions (see screenshots at the end of 
Appendix E). All sessions were finished within an hour. Subjects earned an average of $16, 
including a $5 show-up fee.   
 
4. Theoretic framework  
We show in Appendix A (A.1 – A.3) that the existing prominent theories on social preference, 
such as outcome-based and intention-based models, will not predict the pure gift effect: no 
favoritism towards the Divider P when both dividers chose to give $2. Here we propose a 
theoretical framework to formalize the hypothesis of pure gift effect and illustrate the role of 
moral luck in gift exchange with externality. Our framework modifies Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger (2004)’s intention-based model (henceforth, D&K 2004) by incorporating the 
concept of moral luck. Nagel (1979) defines moral luck as follows: “[w]here a significant aspect 
of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that 
respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck” (also see Williams, 1981; 
Scanlon 2008; Nelkin 2013).12  The theory of moral luck suggests that intention may not be 
                                                          
12 An alternative relevant theory is the social ties model. While van Dijk and van Winden (1997) applied this model to 
public goods environments, Malmendier and Schmidt (2012) are closer to our study, in that they apply the model to 
explain corruption behavior in a variation of gift exchange games. They assume that initially, a decision maker is 
equally concerned about the welfare of all players. But once the gift is given, the gift creates a positive affective bond 
due to the fact that the gift giver chooses a strategy that gives the recipient a higher payoff than the expected payoff. 
Applying their model to our experiment, the question of how much a receiver values a divider’s payoff would be 
determined by the “strategy chosen” by the divider. In particular, a receiver weighs the divider’s payoff more into her 
utility function when the divider chooses to give $2 than when the divider chooses to give $0. Thus, if both dividers 
choose to give $2, their model would predict that the receiver weighs the two dividers’ payoff equally. However, if 
receiving the actual gift strengthens the social ties between the giver and the recipient to a greater degree than 
receiving the intentions of giving, the recipient will weigh the welfare of the actual giver more than that of the 
intended giver. In this case, the social ties model will also predict the pure gift effect. 
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sufficient to predict decisions in a world where outcomes are often determined not only by 
intentions, but also by elements that cannot be controlled. We demonstrate below that when we 
take into account the occurrence of moral luck in personal interactions, we generate different 
predictions of Receiver’s behavior than traditional social preference models.  
Consider our environment where we have Receivers and Dividers. Our focus is the 
Receivers’ decisions in Stage II. Assume a Receiver’s (denoted as R) utility contains two parts: 
her material payoff 𝑚𝑅 ; and her aggregate reciprocal payoff with respect to each of the two 
Dividers (P and N). 
Receiver’s material payoff consists of the earnings from Stage I and Stage II in our 
environment. A Receiver earns a fixed payoff of $11 in Stage II irrespective of her decisions or 
the Dividers’ decisions. When a Divider P chooses to give $2 in Stage I, 𝑚𝑅 = $13; otherwise, 
𝑚𝑅 = $11. 
As in D&K’s model, the Receiver’s reciprocal payoff with respect to each Divider is a 
product of her interpretation of that Divider’s kindness to her and her kindness to that Divider. 
Following D&K, we use 𝜆𝑅𝑗𝑅𝑗∈{𝑃,𝑁}  to represent the Receiver’s perceived intention of Divider j 
toward her. In our environment, 𝜆𝑅𝑗𝑅𝑗∈{𝑃,𝑁}  is determined only by the difference between the 
payoff the Receiver received from Divider j ($0 or $2) and the equitable payoff she deserves. The 
equitable payoff of a Receiver can be specified as the average payoff she could have received 
given the strategy space of the Divider. Given that a Divider can either choose to give $2 or $0, 
the equitable payoff of a Receiver is $1. Thus, 𝜆𝑅𝑗𝑅𝑗∈{𝑃,𝑁} = 1 or − 1.  
We refer to a Receiver’s response to a Divider’s intention specified in D&K (2004) as 
pure intention effect. We now consider that a Divider’s good or bad intention does not necessarily 
result in actual benefit or harm to the Receiver due to random factors out of the Divider’s control. 
Thus, it is important to distinguish between pure intention and received intention. As specified in 
Equation (1), we hypothesize that the Receiver reciprocates to the received intention (kindness or 
unkindness) rather than the perceived pure intention.   
Received intention= 𝑓(𝑤1 ∗ 𝜆𝑅𝑗𝑅 , 𝑤2 ∗ 𝑙𝑅𝑗)𝑗∈{𝑃,𝑁}                        (1) 
where 𝑤1 ∈ [0,1] is the weight assigned to 𝜆𝑅𝑗𝑅𝑗∈{𝑃,𝑁}  and 𝑤2 ∈ [0,1] is the weight assigned to 
𝑙𝑅𝑗𝑗∈{𝑃,𝑁} . 𝑙𝑅𝑗𝑗∈{𝑃,𝑁} ∈
[−1,1]  is the proportion of realized intention of Divider j. When 0 <
𝑙𝑅𝑗𝑗∈{𝑃,𝑁} ≤ 1 , this means that the Receiver receives all or some of the benefit Divider j intended 
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to send. When −1 ≤ 𝑙𝑅𝑗𝑗∈{𝑃,𝑁} < 0, this means the Receiver receives all or some of the harms 
Divider j intended to impose. When 𝑙𝑅𝑗𝑗∈{𝑃,𝑁} = 0 , this means the Divider j’s 
kindness/unkindness does not result in any actual benefit/harm to the Receiver. In our experiment, 
𝑙𝑅𝑁 = 0 regardless of Divider N’s decisions as his decision never benefit or harm a Receiver.  
𝑙𝑅𝑃 = 1 when Divider P gives $2 in Stage I and 𝑙𝑅𝑃 = −1 when Divider P gives $0. We assume 
that 𝑓(. )is a concave, monotonically increasing function, with 𝑓(0,0) = 0. 








the Divider j’s equitable payoff given R choosing efficient strategies. Under Rule 1, 𝑒𝑃,𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑅 =
𝑒𝑁,𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑅 = $2.5. Under Rule 2 or 3, the Divider who earned $2 for each received point has an 
equitable payoff of $5, while the Divider who earned $1 for each received point has an equitable 
payoff of $2.5.  We assume that 𝑔(. ) is a concave, monotonically increasing function14.  
In our revised intention-based model with moral luck, a Receiver’s solves 
max
𝑚𝑗
𝑈𝑅 = 𝑚𝑅 + ∑ 𝑓𝑗∈{𝑃,𝑁} (𝑤1 ∗ 𝜆𝑅𝑗𝑅 , 𝑤2 ∗ 𝑙𝑅𝑗). 𝑔(𝑚
𝑗 − 𝑒𝑗
𝑅)                                  (2) 
Rule 1: s.t.  𝑚𝑃 + 𝑚𝑁 = 5  
Rule 2: s.t. 𝑚𝑃 + 0.5𝑚𝑁 = 5 
Rule 3: s.t. 0.5𝑚𝑃 + 𝑚𝑁 = 5 
 
Our main interest is Receiver’s allocation decision in the two scenarios when both 
Dividers have made the same decision in Stage I: 1) when both Dividers are kind, 𝜆𝑅𝑗𝑅 = 1; 𝑙𝑅𝑃 =
1; 𝑙𝑅𝑁 = 0; and 2) When both Dividers are unkind, 𝜆𝑅𝑗𝑅 = −1; 𝑙𝑅𝑃 = −1; 𝑙𝑅𝑁 = 0. We derive 
the following predictions of these two scenarios (the predictions in the other two scenarios are 
detailed in Appendix A.4). To help differentiate the assigned dollar amount from the amount of 
points, below we use “$” to denote the total dollar amount assigned to each Divider.   
                                                          
13 One difference between our model and D&K (2004) is that we assume a Receiver’s kindness to a Divider follows a 
concave rather than a linear function. The reason is that D&K (2004) applies to environments with mostly dummy 
decision variables, while a Receiver’s decision in our environment can be any integer number between [0,5]. 
Therefore, it makes more sense to have a concave function for utility’s components. 
14 Previous social preference models usually assume a linear utility function. Our prediction of favoritism would not 
change whether the utility function is concave or linear. 
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Propositions15:  As long as 𝑤2 > 0,  
Under Rule 1 
When both Dividers have decided to give $2, $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑁 < 2.5 < $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑃 . $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑃  is increasing in 𝑤2 
and is decreasing in 𝑤1.  
When both Dividers choose not to give, $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑃 < 2.5 < $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑁 . $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑃  is decreasing in 𝑤2 and 
is increasing in 𝑤1. 
Under Rule 2 and Rule 3:  
When both Dividers have decided to give $2,  $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒2
𝑃 > $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒3
𝑁 .  $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒2
𝑃  is increasing in 𝑤2 and 
is decreasing in 𝑤1 and $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒3
𝑁  is decreasing in 𝑤2 and increasing in 𝑤1. 
When both Dividers choose not to give, $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒2
𝑃 < $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒3
𝑁 .  $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒2
𝑃  is decreasing in 𝑤2  and 
increasing in 𝑤1 and $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒3
𝑁  is increasing in 𝑤2 and decreasing in 𝑤1. 
 
Proof: See appendix A.4 for details.  
 
Our framework predicts favoritism toward Divider P both when it is efficiency neutral and 
when it leads to efficiency loss (∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙> 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦> 0), as long as 𝑤2 > 0. Our general 
framework does not produce a unique prediction on how the degree of favoritism may differ when 
it is efficiency costly than when it is efficiency neutral in our setting.  Whether efficiency cost 
mitigates the favoritism depends on: the specifications of g function; how much a Receiver cares 
about pure intention (w1); and how much she cares about to what extent the intention actually 
benefits or harms her (w2). In Appendix A.4, we provide some examples to illustrate the 
comparisons of favoritism under different efficiency cost conditions.  
Our model also predicts that favoritism appears in both Unexpected and Expected 
treatments and its magnitude does not vary between these two treatments. 
 
5. Results 
                                                          
15 Here we provide general predictions assuming a continuous choice space. In the experiment, subjects were allowed 
to allocate only integer points. In Section 6.2, we report data from another robustness check treatment where decimal 
points are allowed.  
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We obtained 64 participants for the Expected treatment and 60 participants for the Unexpected 
treatment. Given that we were interested in Receivers’ allocation decisions when both Dividers 
had identical intentions, we focused on Receivers’ decisions when both Dividers gave $2 (or $0). 
We first report the decisions under Rule 1 and then those under Rule 2 and Rule 3. We also report 
Dividers’ decisions in Stage I at the end of the Results section. In Appendix B, we report 
Receivers’ allocation decisions when the two Dividers made different decisions in Stage I. 
 
5.1. Receiver’s decision when both Dividers decided to give $2 
In both treatments, under Rule 1, we observe that on average Receivers gave significantly more to 
Divider P than to Divider N, even though Divider N was just as generous as Divider P (Expected: 
3.4 vs.1.6; Unexpected 3.1 vs. 1.9; p < 0.01, two-sided Wilcoxon signed-rank test16).  We can 
calculate the degree of favoritism for each Receiver ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙=  $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑃 − $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 1
𝑁 , which is the 
difference between the dollar amount she assigned to Divider P and to Divider N under Rule 1. 
We find no significant difference in the degree of favoritism ( ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 ) between the two 
treatments (1.8 in Expected vs. 1.3 in Unexpected, p = 0.11, two-sided Mann-Whitney test).   
In Figure 2, we report the distribution of ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 . Figure 2 shows that for both the 
Expected and Unexpected treatments, there is a higher proportion of positive ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙  than 
negative ones, which indicates favoritism towards Divider P. Such differences are statistically 
significant (Expected: 97% vs. 3%; Unexpected: 87% vs. 13%, p < 0.01, two-sided M-W test). 
This result supports our predictions and indicates that most Receivers care to what extent they 
actually benefited from the intention rather than pure intention alone. The distribution data also 
suggests that in both treatments there is a non-trivial proportion of Receivers (about 20% in 
Unexpected treatment and 34% in Expected treatment) showing a high degree of favoritism 
toward Divider P (∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙≥ 3).  
Next, we compare the dollar amount Divider P received under Rule 2 and the dollar 
amount Divider N received under Rule 3 to determine whether the favoritism towards Divider P 
persists when it leads to less efficient outcomes. We continue to find that Divider P received 
significantly more under Rule 2 than Divider N under Rule 3 (3.7 vs. 2.0, p < 0.01) in the 
Expected treatment. The same is true for the Unexpected treatment (3.4 vs. 2.1, p < 0.01). Again, 
                                                          
16 Henceforth, unless otherwise notified, p-values are reported using a two-sided signed-rank Wilcoxon test. 
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for each Receiver we can calculate the degree of favoritism as ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦= $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 2
𝑃 − $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 3
𝑁 , which is 
the difference between the dollar amount a Receiver assigned to Divider P under Rule 2 and the 
amount assigned to Divider N under Rule 3. Similar to the findings under Rule 1 (∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙), we 
find ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 does not differ between the two treatments (1.7 vs. 1.3, p = 0.46, two-sided M-W test). 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙($𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑃 − $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑁 ) when both Dividers give $2. 
 
Note: There are two 0% bars underlying  ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙= −5 𝑎𝑛𝑑 − 3; for simplicity, we only note one 0%. 
We apply the same notation for the following figures. 
 
Figure 3 reports the distribution of favoritism (∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦) in both treatments. Supporting our 
predictions, Figure 3 shows that there is a significantly higher proportion of positive ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 than 
negative ones (75% vs. 7% in Expected, p < 0.01; 66% vs. 0% in Unexpected, p < 0.01, two-sided 
M-W test). Similar to Rule 1, we again observe that in both treatments, about 20% of Receivers 
display a high degree of favoritism toward Divider P (∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦≥ 3).  
Comparing ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙  and ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦  in each treatment, our data show that the degree of 
favoritism does not vary with its consequences on efficiency in either the Expected or Unexpected 
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Figure 3: Distribution of ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦= ($𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 2
𝑃 − $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 3
𝑁 ) when both Dividers give $2. 
 
 
5.2. When both Dividers decide not to give  
Our data suggest that a Receiver not only cares about whose kindness actually benefited her, but 
also whose selfish intention essentially harmed her. In both the Expected and Unexpected 
treatments, when both Dividers give $0, we observe that a Receiver gives significantly less to 
Divider P than to Divider N under Rule 1 (Expected: $1.8 vs. $3.2, p < 0.01; Unexpected: $1.6 vs. 
$3.4, p < 0.01). We find no significant difference in the degree of bias against Divider P between 
the two treatments ( ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙: -1.4 in Expected vs. -1.7 in Unexpected; p = 0.63). Figure 4 reports 
the distribution of ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙  in each treatment. Supporting our predictions, we observe a 
significantly higher proportion of negative ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 than position ones (Expected: 75% vs. 25%; 
Unexpected: 86% vs. 13%, p < 0.01, two-sided M-W test). 
We further examine what happens when bias against Divider P also leads to efficiency loss. 
We continue to find that Divider P receives significantly less earnings under Rule 2 than Divider 
N under Rule 3 (Expected: 2.3 vs. 3.4, p < 0.05; Unexpected: 2.3 vs. 3.4, p < 0.01). Like with 
Rule 1, we observe no difference in the degree of bias against Divider P between the two 
treatments ( ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦: -1.1 in Expected vs. -1.1 in Unexpected, p = 0.58, two-sided M-W test). 
Figure 5 further reports the distribution of ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦. Supporting the predictions, the proportion of 
negative ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦  is significantly higher than positive ones (Expected: 47% vs. 15%, p < 0.01; 
Unexpected: 59% vs. 15%, p < 0.01, two-sided M-W test).  
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Figure 4: Distribution of ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 ($𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒1
𝑃 − $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 1
𝑁 ) when both Dividers give $0. 
 
 
Figure 5: Distribution of ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦= ($𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 2
𝑃 − $𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒 3
𝑁 ) when both Dividers give $0. 
 
 
Similar to the case when both Dividers give $2, we find no significant difference between 
∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 and ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 (Expected: -1.4 vs. -1.1, p=0.18; Unexpected : -1.7 vs. -1.1, p=0.06). Our data 
also show that overall a majority of those receivers who favor Divider P when both dividers give 
$2 also display the negative bias toward Divider P when both give $0. First, we examine the case 
under Rule 1 ( ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙) . In the Expected treatment, among the 31 receivers who display 
favoritism toward Divider P (∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙> 0) , when both dividers give $2, 23 (74%) of them also 
hold a negative bias toward Divider P (∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙< 0) when both give $0. This percentage is 84% 
(22 out of 26) in the Unexpected treatment. Next, we examine the case when the bias leads to 
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treatment who favor Divider P (∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 > 0) when both dividers give $2. Among these receivers, 
46% of them (11 out of 24) in the Expected and 60% (12 out of 20) in the Unexpected also hold a 
negative bias toward Divider P (∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 < 0); 33% of them (8 out of 24) in the Expected and 35% 
(7 out of 20) in the Unexpected treat the two dividers equally (∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 = 0) when both give $0. 
 
5.3. Dividers’ behavior and belief 
We find that a significantly greater proportion of Dividers gave $2 in the Expected than in the 
Unexpected treatment (31% vs. 6.7%, p < 0.05. two-sided M-W test), suggesting that Dividers 
expect their Receiver to allocate more to them if they act generously. As mentioned in Section 3, 
we elicited Dividers’ beliefs regarding Receivers’ allocation decisions in Stage II for each 
scenario of Stage I. Again, here we focus on the case when both Dividers make the same decisions 
in Stage I. As we report below, the survey data suggests that Dividers expect positive bias toward 
Divider P when both Dividers are generous, but fail to predict negative bias against Divider P 
when both are selfish. Again, we observe no difference in the belief data between the Expected 
and Unexpected treatments.  
 For the scenario in which both Dividers chose to give $2 in Stage I, on average, Dividers 
expected Receivers to give significantly more to Divider P who chose to equally split the $4 than 
to Divider N, even though Divider N was just as generous as Divider P under Rule 1 (Expected: 
2.9 vs. 2.1; Unexpected: 3.0 vs. 2.0; p < 0.01). Dividers also correctly predicted that the favoritism 
would persist even when it led to efficiency losses: Dividers expected that Divider P would 
receive significantly more earnings under Rule 2 than Divider N under Rule 3 (Expected: 3.0 vs. 
2.2, p < 0.01; Unexpected: 3.2 vs. 2.2, p < 0.01). 
 Interestingly, Dividers do not seem to expect significant negative bias against Divider P in 
the scenario where both Dividers act selfishly. Under Rule 1, on average, Dividers expected no 
significant differences in the amount allocated to Divider P and to Divider N (Expected: 2.3 vs. 
2.8, p =0.41; Unexpected: 2.4 vs. 2.6, p < 0.83). Similarly, Dividers did not expect significant 
difference in the allocation amount to Divider P under Rule 2 and to Divider N under Rule 3 
(Expected: 2.3 vs. 2.7, p =0.98; Unexpected: 2.4 vs. 2.6, p = 0.78).  
We also calculated Dividers’ belief of ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙  and ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦  to measure the degree of 
Dividers’ expected bias and provided statistic comparisons between the two treatments (see Table 
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4). As shown in Table 4, there is no difference between the Expected and Unexpected treatment in 
any cases.  
 







Expected Unexpected M-W test Expected Unexpected M-W test 
Both Dividers 
gave $2 
0.8 1.1 P = 0.44 0.8 1.0 P = 0.39 
Both Dividers 
gave $0 




6.1 Expected vs. Unexpected  
We provide experimental evidence supporting the pure gift hypothesis. Receivers treat the 
dividers differently depending on whether the dividers’ kindness actually affected the receivers’ 
payoffs. Interestingly, we do not observe significant differences between the Expected and 
Unexpected treatments. This result is in keeping with some of the previous literature on related 
topics. For example, Strassmair (2009) finds that in a modified trust game, the trustee’s behavior 
is not affected by the investor’s expected probability of being reciprocated. One implication of our 
finding is that pure gift effect occurs regardless of whether the gift giver is purely altruistic or acts 
kindly for future returns.  
Yet, one may argue that our manipulation of the Expected and Unexpected treatments may 
not be effective in that it does not lead receivers to interpret the giving behavior differently. To 
examine this possibility, we analyzed the receiver’s belief of the intention of the gift. In the survey 
at the end of the experiment, we asked each Receiver to answer two questions: 1) “Please tell us 
what you think why some Dividers might choose Option A (to give $2 to a Receiver)?”; and 2) 
“Please tell us what you think why some Dividers might choose to give $0.” Receivers’ answers 
provided insights on whether they interpreted Dividers’ behavior differently in the Expected and 
Unexpected treatments.   
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We note that when Dividers choose to give $2, their intention can be interpreted as either 
generous or selfish depending on whether there is a possibility of future returns. In contrast, it is 
natural to assume that such contingent interpretations may not be applied to “stingy” behavior 
(giving $0). Indeed, we find that most Receivers, in their answers to the second question, 
mentioned things like “greedy,” “want money,” “don’t trust receivers,” “don’t believe that 
Receivers will give more,” “don’t see long term benefit,” etc. All of these indicate perception of 
selfish motives. It is therefore unsurprising that we do not observe a significant difference in 
Receivers’ behavior between the two treatments when both Dividers give $0. Our analysis 
reported below focuses on the answers to the first question.  
To provide a formal analysis, we applied a method developed in Houser and Xiao (2011). 
Specifically, for each set of the answer messages we obtained in each treatment, we recruited 
another 5 subjects to code the answers. Each coder was instructed to classify every message into 
three categories: Self-interest; Nice; or Others. For each message, coders could choose more than 
one category.17 Each coder earned $10 (including a $5 show-up bonus) for completing coding. At 
the end of the session, two messages were randomly chosen. For each of the two messages, if their 
code matched with the most common codes by other coders, they would receive another $5.18  
The inter-rater reliability is quite satisfactory, with the combined kappa statistics at k 
=0.83, z = 18.7 in the Unexpected treatment, k=0.77, z=11.8 for the Expected treatment.19 In 
particular, 71.67% (43 messages) reached 100% agreement among the 5 coders, while 26.67% (16 
messages) reached 80% agreement, and only one message had an agreement rate of 60%.  
The coding results suggest a difference in Receivers’ perceived intentions of Dividers 
between the two treatments. In particular, those who believed that a Divider gives because he is 
nice increased significantly from 12.9% in the Expected treatment to 51.7% in the Unexpected 
treatment (two-sided M-W test, p < 0.01). On the other hand, those who believed a Divider gives 
for self-interest decreased significantly from 83.9% in the Expected treatment to 37.9% in the 
                                                          
17 When coding a message solely in the “Other” category (8 out of 270 codes), coders were also asked to add a 
comment. 6 (out of the 8) codes are related to “Self-interest” (e.g. desire, strategizing). We treat these same as coding 
“Self-interest.” 2 other comments are related to “confused”.  
18 When a coder classified a message into more than one category, we pick the one that receives most agreement 
among the other four coders.  
19 One of the coders was dropped due to 3 missing observations (where he chose a category not included in the 
instruction but did not provide his personal explanation). Including him will not change the significance, k=0.62, z= 
13.2 (assuming that is a category different from other coders).   
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Unexpected treatment (two-sided M-W test, p < 0.01). The percentage of those who believed that 
a Divider’s giving might be due to a mixed motive of both was low in both Expected treatment 
(3.2%) and Unexpected (10.3%, two-sided M-W test, p = 0.29). These results exclude the 
possibility that the non-significant treatment difference is due to the inefficient treatment 
manipulation.  
We also examined whether there is any significant behavioral difference between those 
who believe a Divider gives out of “nice” motives and those who believe a Divider gives for “self-
interest” reasons. We group Receivers according to their interpretations of Dividers’ intentions 
and calculate the degree of favoritism ( ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 and ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦) within each coding category. To 
ensure we have a sufficient number of observations in each category, we pool the two treatments 
together. We find that on average, ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙  does not differ between the two categories (“nice” vs. 
“self-interest”) (1.63 vs. 1.54, p = 0.85, two-sided M-W test). The same result holds when 
favoring Divider P leads to efficiency loss ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦: 1.63 vs. 1.56, p = 0.86, two-sided M-W test). 
This is consistent with the result that the degree of favoritism is independent of whether the gift 
giver is purely altruistic or acts kindly for future returns. 
One explanation for the result of non-significant treatment effect is that in our 
experiment, the receivers’ decision is to allocate points between Divider P and Divider N, 
rather than to each divider separately. Thus, the decisions should be determined by the 
differences between the two Dividers. Our design ensures that when both dividers give $2, the 
receiver should interpret the intentions of the two dividers in the same way, be it kindness (in 
the Unexpected treatment) or selfish (in the Expected treatment). Regardless of the treatment, 
from the perspective of the receiver, the difference between the two Dividers is only from 
whom she actually receives the gift. Our results suggest that favoritism can be driven by 
reciprocity to the actual gift regardless of the underlying intention of the gift. This result is also 
consistent with the prediction of our model in Section 4.  
 
6.2. Robustness checks  
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In the experiment we reported above, receivers can only allocate an integer number of points. 
Thus, under Rule 1, receivers have to choose one Divider to favor 20 . This feature of the 
experiment is similar to some situations in naturally occurring environments, such as the political 
campaign where voters can vote only one candidate. However, in many other cases, a gift 
recipient may have the opportunity to treat both the actual gift giver and the intended gift giver 
equally. For example, a government official may have multiple contracts to allocate among the 
(actual/intended) gift givers. It is important to examine whether pure gift effect would still present 
when the receivers have the option to make an equal allocation between the two dividers. We thus 
conducted another experiment with the only change being that we allowed Receivers to assign 
decimal points in both the Expected and the Unexpected treatments. Thus, in this new experiment, 
an equal split was possible under Rule 1. We recruited another 124 participants from the same 
subject pool (32 pairs in the Unexpected treatment and 30 pairs in the Expected treatment ). We 
continued to observe a bias towards Divider P in the new experiment. Below we report the results 
when both dividers gave $2. The results of the negative bias toward Divider P when both gave $0 
are reported in Appendix C.   
On average, receivers gave significantly more to Divider P than to Divider N under Rule 1 
(Expected: 3.2 vs. 1.8; Unexpected: 2.8 vs. 2.2; p < 0.01). Divider P also received significantly 
more under Rule 2 than Divider N under Rule 3 (Expected: 3.4 vs. 2.1; Unexpected: 3.3 vs. 2.7; p 
< 0.01 for both). The favoritism remained even when it reduced efficiency. Receivers allocated 
significantly more to Divider P under Rule 2 than Divider N under Rule 3 (Expected: 3.4 vs. 2.1, 
Unexpected: 3.3 vs. 2.7, p < 0.01). We also calculated ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 and ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 to measure favoritism 
for each receiver. The distributions of ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙 and ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 are plotted in Figure D1 and D2 in 
Appendix D.  We find 74% receivers displayed favoritism when it was efficiency neutral 
(∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙> 0) in the Expected treatment and 44% did so in the Unexpected treatment. When 
favoritism reduced efficiency, about 64% receivers in the Expected and 50% in the Unexpected 
treatment favored Divider P (∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦> 0).   
                                                          
20 Note that this is not the case when we compare between Rule 2 and Rule 3. While the first experiment does not 
allow ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙= 0, ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦  can still be equal to zero. Thus, in principle, allowing equal splits in the second experiment 
may reduce the proportion of positive ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙, but it should not affect the distribution of ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 . In practice, however, 
subjects in the first experiment may infer that they should treat the two dividers differently when equal split is not 
allowed. If so, allowing equal splits can also have an impact on ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦  in the second experiment. 
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The data from this new experiment show that the overall majority of receivers still favored 
Divider P even when they could treat the two dividers equally. On the other hand, compared with 
treatments where equal splits were not allowed, the percentage of efficiency-neutral favoritism 
(∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙> 0) was significantly lower when we allowed equal splits (Expected: 74% vs. 97%; 
Unexpected: 44% vs. 87%. Z-tests, p ≤ 0.01). This result suggests that some receivers would treat 
the two dividers equally if possible, but they would favor Divider P when an equal treatment is 
not allowed. Note that both the previous experiment and this new experiment allow ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦= 0. It 
is not surprising that the differences in the proportion of positive   ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦  between these two 
experiments are much smaller and not significant (Expected: 64% vs.75%; Unexpected: 50% vs. 
66%. Z-test, p > 0.10)21. 
In sum, the data from the second experiment suggests that the pure gift effect exists even 
when the recipients are given the option to treat the gift givers equally22. 
 
7. Conclusion  
Gift giving is a widespread phenomenon that has an important impact on how decisions are made 
in politics, business, the legal system, the health care system, sports, education, and many other 
domains with substantial economic consequences. In this paper, we design an experiment to 
understand the driving force underlying the gift recipient’s reciprocal behavior toward the gift 
giver when such behavior harms a third party’s interest.  We show that intentions alone cannot 
explain reciprocity with a negative externality. We introduce the ideal of moral luck in the 
existing intention-based model and provide both a theoretical framework and experimental 
evidence for a pure gift effect: a gift receiver will favor the gift giver from whom she receives a 
gift over a third party who paid the identical cost to signal the intention to give. Such favoritism 
persists even when it leads to less efficient social outcomes, and even under circumstances when 
the recipients know that the gift giver does not expect any return.   
                                                          
21 The results of the comparisons between the second and the first experiments are the same when we compare the 
magnitude of ∆𝑛𝑒𝑢𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙  and ∆𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑙𝑦 .  
22 It is interesting to note that, similar to the first experiment, the degree of favoritism is lower in the Unexpected 
treatment than in the Expected treatment. However, once again we find non-significant treatment differences in all 
conditions except the case where receivers have to make allocation decisions under Rule 1 when both Dividers give 
$2 (44% vs. 73%, Z-test, p = 0.02). A joint test shows that there is no significant difference between the Expected and 
the Unexpected treatments overall (p > 0.10, F test). Yet it is possible that the non-significance is due to the lack of 
power of our sample size. 
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Our findings contribute to the existing social preference literature by shedding light on 
behavior in gift exchange environments with negative externalities. We revise the intention-based 
model by taking into account that whether the intended action can be fully realized is often 
beyond the actor’s control. People care not only about intentions, but also to what extent 
intentions contribute to ultimate outcomes.  We show that our model predicts the pure gift effect. 
To provide clean evidence on the pure gift effect, we design the experiment such that it is 
transparent to the receiver that the two potential gift givers have exactly the same intention. In the 
naturally occurring environments, it is of course often hard to verify the true intentions 
independent of the outcomes. Humans might be wired to react first to tangible realizations while 
beliefs regarding intentions may be important as second-order considerations.     
Moreover, our model applies not only to positive intentions, but also to negative ones. Our 
experiment shows that when both Dividers act selfishly, the Receiver’s allocation decision is 
biased against the paired Divider regardless of whether such an allocation decision is socially 
optimal. This result complements a recent study on delegation where principals blame agents for 
bad outcomes beyond their control (Gurdal et al. 2013). Our study suggests that the 
blameworthiness of negative intentions can be reduced if, by chance, the intentions did not lead to 
bad outcomes.  
Our results provide behavioral insights for recent research on corruption. Hicken et al 
(2015) compared effectiveness of two intervention mechanisms on controlling vote switches due 
to vote-buying activities. In one mechanism, voters promise not to accept any gift from the 
candidates; in the other mechanism, voters can accept gifts, yet promise to vote according to their 
conscience. Our model predicts that the former mechanism will be more effective than the latter 
for the reason that in the former mechanism, by not accepting the gift, voters receive only the 
intention from the candidate.  By contrast, in the latter mechanism, the voters receive not only the 
intention but also the actual gift from the candidate. This prediction is consistent with their 
findings. 
We show that the favoritism does not vary with the purpose of giving, whether it was to 
influence the recipient’s decisions or to be purely kind to the recipient. For example, even 
altruistic donation may lead recipients to favor donors at a cost to others. In situations where 
recipients’ favoritism toward donors may result in less efficient social outcomes, it might be 
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socially desirable to keep anonymity of all donors, both those who expect reciprocity and those 
who do not have such expectations. 
To provide clean evidence for the pure gift effect, in our study, the gift recipient is “forced” 
to receive the gift. In naturally occurring environments, an agent can often decide whether to 
accept the gift.  Recent studies have shown that an option to choose the gift does have an impact 
on receiver’s decisions (Gneezy et al 2013). It seems important to investigate to what extent an 
intended recipient may resist the temptation to accept a gift, and how a recipient’s allocation 
decisions may differ depending on whether she has that choice. Our own continuing research 
targets these questions.  
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